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THE DEAN TAKES HIS STAND
Julien Monnet’s 1912 Harvard Law Review Article Denouncing
Oklahoma’s Discriminatory Grandfather Clause
HARRY F. TEPKER*
I. Introduction
Three years after becoming the first dean of the law school at the University
of Oklahoma—the same year that the first class graduated—and after ensuring
that “[t]he study of law at the University of Oklahoma was off to a promising
start,”1 Julien C. Monnet published an article in the Harvard Law Review on
the controversial “grandfather clause” of the Oklahoma Constitution.2
Immediately after statehood, Oklahoma had moved swiftly to exclude blacks
from politics.3 The “grandfather clause” allowed persons who were eligible
to vote in 1866 and their lineal descendants to register to vote without passing
a literacy test as a qualification.4 The purpose of the measure was to exclude
black voters without excluding too many white voters, and Oklahoma’s law

* J.D., Duke University School of Law, 1976; Floyd and Irma Calvert Chair of Law and
Liberty, Professor of Law, and Associate Dean of Scholarship and Enrichment, University of
Oklahoma College of Law. The author thanks his colleagues, Drew L. Kershen and Darin Fox,
and his research assistant, Kayna Stavast-Piper, for their assistance in the research and
development of this article. Also, the author thanks David W. Levy, David Ross Boyd
Professor Emeritus of History, for his special, thoughtful aid and advice. Of course, all errors
and responsibility are the author’s own.
1. 1 DAVID W. LEVY, THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA: A HISTORY 222 (2005).
2. See Julien C. Monnet, The Latest Phase of Negro Disfranchisement, 26 HARV. L. REV.
42 (1912-1913), reprinted in 62 OKLA. L. REV. 407 (2010). Dean Monnet’s article has been
cited in many works over the years, including recent law review publications. See, e.g., Gabriel
J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the CounterMajoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 90 & n.152 (2008); David P. Currie,
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1910-1921, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1134 n.117;
Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1161 n.140
(1977); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Life of the Law: Values, Commitment, and
Craftsmanship, 100 HARV. L. REV. 795, 810 n.72 (1987); Mary Ellen Maatman, Speaking Truth
to Memory: Lawyers and Resistance to the End of White Supremacy, 50 HOW. L.J. 1, 17 n.88
(2006); Susanah M. Mead, Evolution of the “Species of Tort Liability” Created by 42 U.S.C.
1983: Can Constitutional Tort Be Saved from Extinction?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 19 n.96
(1986); Richard H. Pildes, Keeping Legal History Meaningful, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 645, 65152 & n.23 (2002).
3. See Monnet, supra note 2, at 42.
4. See id. (quoting OKLA. CONST. of 1907, art. 3, § 4a (1910)).
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school dean said so in no uncertain terms.5 Soon after publication of Monnet’s
article, the issues discussed therein came before the Supreme Court of the
United States, which upheld the Dean’s views.6 As Benno Schmidt wrote,
“For the first time, in the Grandfather Clause Cases in 1915, the Supreme
Court applied the Fifteenth Amendment and what was left of the federal civil
rights statutes to strike down state laws calculated to deny blacks the right to
vote.”7
The Dean’s excellent reputation was of no use when word of his article
spread throughout the state. The Daily Oklahoman, Oklahoma City’s largest
newspaper, published a story quoting the Dean’s article nearly in its entirety.8
Thus, the state’s leadership knew that the Dean had the courage—or
temerity—to assert an opinion on an issue central to the struggle between two
active and strong political parties.9 And he did so from a position in a
university already suffering from partisan crossfire.10 His friends reported that
he acted “[i]n complete disregard of the scorn heaped upon him,”11 but
afterward he confined his defense of the Constitution to the law school.12 The
Dean’s many, admiring students would remember his “basic legal tenet—‘The

5. See id. at 52. As Dean Monnet noted, Oklahoma’s law also exempted persons who had
been residing in foreign countries in 1866, whether voting or not, from the literacy test
requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 53-58.
6. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S.
368, 381-82 (1915) (collectively known as the Grandfather Clause Cases) (invalidating under
the Fifteenth Amendment “grandfather clauses” designed to disenfranchise blacks through
literacy tests while exempting whites from taking the tests).
7. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., 9 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910-21, at 725 (Paul
A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1984).
8. See Grandfather Clause; Is It Constitutional? Dean Monnet Discusses Law, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 17, 1912, at B-1.
9. See BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 928 (noting that “there was vigorous two-party
politics in Oklahoma, and blacks made up less than 9 percent of the population, lending
credence to the objections of Oklahoma Republicans that, as one put it in a letter to President
Taft, the Grandfather Clause was ‘adopted for the express purpose of disfranchising negro
voters, not because they are black, but because they vote the Republican ticket’”).
10. See generally LEVY, supra note 1, at 150-73.
11. KENNY A. FRANKS & PAUL F. LAMBERT, THE LEGACY OF DEAN JULIEN C. MONNET:
JUDGE LUTHER BOHANON AND THE DESEGREGATION OF OKLAHOMA CITY’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS
7 (1983); see also DAVE R. MCKOWN, THE DEAN: THE LIFE OF JULIEN C. MONNET 242 (1973)
(noting that Monnet’s Harvard article “went over like an inebriated bum at a meeting of the
Women’s Christian Temperance Union”).
12. See MCKOWN, supra note 11, at 245.
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Constitution, it must be enforced.’”13 Unfortunately, a dean’s fidelity to
constitutionalism was not then an academic freedom.14 “That he retained his
position [as dean] is perhaps something of a miracle . . . . [F]or three years the
Dean had to endure the obloquy and reproach which continued to shower
down on him.”15
II. Brushing Aside a Thin Gauze of Words
At the outset of the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to
have abandoned the task of enforcing16 the Fifteenth Amendment,17 even when
litigants challenged state voter-registration schemes believed—apparently even
by the Justices themselves—to be a “fraud upon the Constitution of the United
States.”18 As Professor Schmidt observed, “The Supreme Court’s response to
black disfranchisement was to confess judicial impotence.”19 Nevertheless, in
1912, the Dean’s position was that Oklahoma’s “grandfather clause” violated
the Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.20 He offered not only an
argument, but a prophecy: “[I]f the Oklahoma case reaches the Supreme Court
of the United States in a form that demands a decision on the constitutionality

13. FRANKS & LAMBERT, supra note 11, at ix, 3.
14. See MCKOWN, supra note 11, at 242 (“He indubitably proved that one could be both
correct and righteous and still fail to win friends and influence people, especially politicians
nursing a deep racial prejudice. Alas, there were far too many of this stamp in Oklahoma.”).
15. Id. at 245 (“Because of the scars accumulated out of this experience, there is no record
that the Dean ever again entangled himself in the political thickets of Oklahoma. To the very
great loss to education in general and to legal education in particular, there likewise is no
evidence that he ever again contributed an article for publication.”).
16. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (upholding the dismissal of a challenge
to allegedly fraudulent state voter-registration procedures, in part because the requested
relief—an order to register a particular voter—was not a remedy for sweeping fraud); Williams
v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (upholding Mississippi’s requirement that a voter show an
understanding of the Constitution to the satisfaction of registrars); see also BICKEL & SCHMIDT,
supra note 7, at 927; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 37-38 (2004).
17. The Fifteenth Amendment provides:
XXSection 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.
XXSection 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
18. Giles, 189 U.S. at 486.
19. BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 923.
20. See Monnet, supra note 2, at 47-48.
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of the act[,] . . . it will be held invalid.”21 Three years later, the Dean’s
prophecy was fulfilled in the landmark case of Guinn v. United States.22
The University of Oklahoma College of Law still displays many
photographs of Dean Monnet for all faculty and students to see. There is still
a statue just outside the south entrance. As many have noted, he never smiles.
His face is not expressive, but the same cannot be said of the Dean’s Harvard
article. To sustain his thesis and his prediction, Monnet made several points.
First, though the Fifteenth Amendment conferred the right to vote on no one,
it restricted the broad powers of the states by denying them the authority to
draw lines among citizens based solely on “race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.”23 Second, Oklahoma’s “grandfather clause” was arbitrary and
unreasonable,24 despite the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s contrary opinion in
Atwater v. Hassett.25 Monnet believed that the clause probably violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,26 even under the
deferential principles employed by federal courts of the era.27 Third, but most
decisively, though the “grandfather clause” did not mention race explicitly, it
could not be understood as anything but a denial of the right to vote on the
basis of race and was therefore in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.28
Monnet pointedly questioned, “[I]s it not a trespass upon the dignity of a court
to expect it to refuse to brush aside so thin a gauze of words?”29 Finally, and
anticlimactically, the Dean observed that it was not clear if the law supplied
a remedy for the constitutional violation.30
As Dean Monnet noted, Oklahoma’s “grandfather clause” was only the
“latest phase” in a regional pattern of deliberate exclusion of black citizens
from the political process that began with Mississippi’s infamous convention
and constitution of 1890.31 Some of the southern states enacted laws with the
aim of excluding blacks without excluding whites—although they did not say

21. Id. at 59.
22. 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (holding that Oklahoma’s constitutional amendment—the
“grandfather clause”—violated the Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
23. See Monnet, supra note 2, at 43-48 (quoting, inter alia, U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1).
24. See id. at 49-53.
25. 1910 OK 299, 111 P. 802 (upholding Oklahoma’s “grandfather clause”).
26. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part,
“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. See Monnet, supra note 2, at 49-53.
28. See id. at 56-57.
29. Id. at 57.
30. See id. at 59-60.
31. See id. at 42.
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so explicitly.32 Other statutes were designed to achieve the same objectives by
delegating “wide discretionary powers” to state officials.33 The Dean
contended that Oklahoma’s amendment was “the most sweeping attempt yet
made constitutionally to include all whites and exclude all blacks from the
privilege of voting.”34 Oklahoma’s approach was a “definite classification,
which itself accomplishe[d] the purpose.”35 There was no need to depend on
the discretion of local officials.36
As required by the conventions of good scholarship, the Dean placed his
argument in context. It is true, he explained, that “suffrage comes not from the
nation but from the state,”37 and that “[s]trictly speaking the United States can
have no national electorate.”38 Even so, Monnet continued, the Fifteenth
Amendment restricts state power and discretion. The federal government has
“full power to protect the exercise of the franchise from any act of the state
tending to deny or abridge it on the ground of race.”39 The Dean also noted the
factor that would eventually lead him to despair about a potential remedy: the
Fifteenth Amendment’s impact is confined to race discrimination by state
officers.40 In 1912, as in 2010, this principle was “well-settled,” but its
“application [was] not always clear.”41 The issue of justiciability added
another dimension to the problem because “mere passage of an
unconstitutional law by the legislative authority . . . gives a right of redress to
no one, for the reason that such an act as yet is legally harmless.”42
Nevertheless, the Dean confidently asserted that constitutional law “stops short
of . . . absurdity.”43 Congress has a real and practical power to enact
preventive and remedial legislation, he said.44 Moreover, “under the Fifteenth
Amendment the actions of the officers who actually reject a voter’s application
to register or vote are the acts of the state and may be dealt with
accordingly.”45 Thus, he explained that the state itself need not be sued

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 48.
See id.
Id.
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because individual officers acting under the authority of the state are
accountable in federal court.46
Dean Monnet revealed his passionate objections—in the technical tones and
terms of a scholar—when he assessed whether the “grandfather clause”
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.47 He did
not need to do this. His analysis was a digression from his central argument
rooted in the Fifteenth Amendment. The Dean acknowledged, “It is not . . .
under the Fourteenth but under the Fifteenth Amendment that these
disfranchising acts have usually been sought to be overthrown.”48 Hence, his
Fourteenth Amendment argument seems designed to attack—in forceful
terms—the decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Atwater v.
Hassett.49 In Atwater, Chief Justice Robert Lee Williams said that Oklahoma’s
“grandfather clause” was “based upon a reason; that is, that any person who
[had been] entitled to vote under a form of government on or prior to [January
1, 1866, was] still presumed to be qualified to exercise such right.”50
Oklahoma’s populism, like the populism of the era throughout the South,
embraced a narrow concept of equality that stopped far short of racial equality.
The author of the opinion in Atwater, Chief Justice Williams, adhered to the
populist view that blacks should be excluded from politics. In one of his many
lectures from the bench, he conveyed his disenchantment with the egalitarian
precepts of populism: “Neither the Constitution nor Congress makes people
equal. Some Socialists might preach the doctrine, but even God Almighty
didn’t make people equal.”51 Tragically, the chief justice was expressing a
view dominant in Oklahoma.52
Responding to the conclusion of Chief Justice Williams, the Dean employed
an apparently gentle tone—temporarily. He conceded that the “based upon a
reason” claim seemed sound, but pointed out that the rationale was “much
weakened” when one considered the fact that “the right [was] given to a

46. See id.
47. See id. at 49-53.
48. Id. at 53.
49. 1910 OK 299, 111 P. 802.
50. Id. ¶ 34, 111 P. at 812.
51. EDWARD EVERETT DALE & JAMES D. MORRISON, PIONEER JUDGE: THE LIFE OF ROBERT
LEE WILLIAMS 298 (1958), quoted in Harry F. Tepker, Jr., The Judges of the Court of Appeals,
in THE FEDERAL COURTS OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 319, 357 (James K. Logan ed.,
1992).
52. Williams would resign from the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1914 to run for governor.
Tepker, supra note 51, at 356. His decision in Atwater seems consistent with both his political
philosophy and his own political self-interest.
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former voter ‘under any form of government.’”53 Accordingly, the Dean
suggested that Williams’s assertion was “not wholly convincing.”54
Then Dean Monnet began a more forceful and biting attack on Chief Justice
Williams’s argument that offspring of exempted individuals deserved an
exemption from the duty to take a literacy test. In Atwater, Williams wrote,
“The virtues and intelligence of the ancestor will be imputed to his
descendants, just as the iniquity of the fathers may be visited upon the children
unto the third and fourth generation.”55 Oklahoma’s highest court, Monnet
objected, stated “a principle opposed to American tradition and ideals.”56 He
argued, “Inheritance of governmental rights finds no sanction in American
history or life. As the American electorate is the true ruler in this country, the
adoption of the principle of inheritance in the choice of such ruler means a
return to the rejected European system.”57 More relevant to equal protection
themes, the Oklahoma court’s presumptions were an offense against reason
according to Monnet:
Can it be seriously contended that residence abroad is a rational
qualification for voters as against residence at home? For it must
be remembered that under the clause it is not even necessary that
the foreigner be one who was permitted to vote in his own country
or who lived in a nation having an electorate.58
When the Dean advanced this argument, it was the era of Plessy v.
Ferguson.59 Judges in the federal courts did not resist racism in state law.60
Judges were not yet using the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for “strict
scrutiny” of legislation that either used “suspect classifications” or burdened
“fundamental rights.” That well-known principle developed much later,61
53. Monnet, supra note 2, at 51.
54. Id.
55. Atwater, ¶ 34, 111 P. at 812.
56. Monnet, supra note 2, at 51.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 52.
59. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that “separate but equal” places of public accommodation
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause), overruled by Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 82-87 (2007) (summarizing Plessy-era Supreme Court and lower federal court
decisions deferring to “[a]n overwhelming consensus among whites [that] favored preserving
‘racial purity’” and state-initiated disenfranchisement practices).
61. See, e.g., Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (using an early
form of “strict scrutiny” as a judicial means to strike down a state’s sterilization policy in order
to protect the “basic civil rights of man” against “invidious discriminations”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010

434

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:427

though with the benefit of at least a hint or portent in Guinn, Oklahoma’s
“grandfather clause” case.62 When Monnet wrote, the Equal Protection Clause
was still the argument of last resort, and judges tended to view an equal
protection theory as a confession that a lawyer had little else in an argument
to trust.63 Dean Monnet surely knew this, but the equal protection theme
allowed him to make a point—with passion, emphasis, and even indignation:
“The equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent
classification, and the question is, ‘Is the classification or discrimination
prescribed thereby purely arbitrary, or has it some basis in that which has a
reasonable relation to the object sought to be accomplished?’”64
The early-twentieth-century standards of equal protection jurisprudence
required little explanation from state governments, even for restrictions on
voting.65 So, when a state law-school dean concluded that the state’s
explanations were irrational and that the “grandfather clause” violated equal
protection, Oklahoma political elites—and a powerful chief justice—felt the
sting. The Dean committed an aggravated offense against the state’s political
order, because he was right:
These classifications are wholly arbitrary. They are not founded on
any distinction referring to the suffrage itself. By no sort of
reasoning can it be made to appear that residence in a foreign
nation is a special qualification for voting in this, or that such nonresidence is a better preparation for the franchise than residence in
our own country, or that a voter is necessarily better qualified than
another because he had an ancestor who voted.66
Monnet argued that Oklahoma was not only unreasonable, it was “extreme.”
For example, no other state had adopted the “most radical feature[]” of the
Oklahoma scheme—permanence.67 The Dean had additional problems with
the apparent rationale of the law:

62. See discussion infra Part III.
63. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (rejecting an equal protection
argument in the context of forced sterilization of mentally impaired persons).
64. Monnet, supra note 2, at 49. Dean Monnet also quoted renowned constitutional law
scholar Thomas Cooley: “All regulations of the elective franchise must be reasonable, uniform,
and impartial; they must not have for their purpose directly or indirectly to deny or abridge the
constitutional right of citizens to vote. If they do, they must be declared void.” Id. (quoting
THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 758 (Alexis C. Angeli ed., 6th ed. Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1890)).
65. See cases cited supra note 16.
66. Monnet, supra note 2, at 52.
67. See id.
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It will hardly be seriously contended that an enactment requiring a
property or educational qualification for all voters, but providing
that the same should not apply to democrats, or masons, or those in
the state residing north of the Canadian River, would be
constitutional, not to speak of lineal descendants of such persons;
yet such distinctions are hardly more artificial and arbitrary than
the distinctions actually made.68
Thus, even under deferential standards of equal protection, the clause was
“perhaps the most vulnerable to attack on constitutional grounds,” according
to Monnet.69 Without hesitation or qualification, Dean Monnet concluded that
Oklahoma’s discriminatory clause “amount[ed] to a denial of the equal
protection of the laws, for it is through the instrumentality of suffrage that our
greatest protection comes.”70 Dean Monnet then expressed scorn for
Oklahoma’s policy and the chief justice’s reasoning (perhaps in terms similar
to what a law student would have heard after making a poorly prepared
argument in response to Socratic interrogation). Monnet borrowed and
adopted a federal court’s denunciation of another state’s argument as his own
final word about Chief Justice Williams’s claim that the “grandfather clause”
was “based upon a reason”: “The statement is appalling, the outrage
stupendous, the result close to the border land that divides outrage from crime.
It is not necessary to discuss it further; likely the least said about it the
better.”71
Next, Dean Monnet turned to the central Fifteenth Amendment issue. He
acknowledged that “[a] case somewhat confidently relied on by advocates of
the modern grandfather clause [was] Williams v. Mississippi.”72 In that case,
a white grand jury indicted a black man for murder.73 Relying on an equal

68. Id. at 53.
69. Id.
70. Id. This statement hints at the more modern principle that state restrictions on voting
deserve special judicial attention. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621,
627-28 (1969); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (both applying
a formulation of “strict scrutiny” to state deprivations of the fundamental right to vote).
71. Monnet, supra note 2, at 53 (quoting Mills v. Green, 67 F. 818, 831 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895),
rev’d for lack of jurisdiction, 69 F. 852 (4th Cir. 1895), aff’d as moot, 159 U.S. 651 (1895)); see
also supra text accompanying note 50. The trial court’s opinion in Mills denounced as
“appalling” the implications of South Carolina’s voter registration statute. See Mills, 67 F. at
831. The statute effectively ensured that if a voter failed to register or was disqualified from
registering in 1882, he could never vote in any future election. Id.
72. Monnet, supra note 2, at 55 (citing Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898)).
73. Williams, 170 U.S. at 213.
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protection theory similar to that in Strauder v. West Virginia,74 the defendant
objected to the grand jury of only white men.75 The jury was all white because
jurors had to be electors,76 and registration officials in Mississippi had broad,
arbitrary power to exclude blacks from registering to vote.77 Mississippi’s
constitution provided that electors must be able to read and write and to
understand the Constitution of the United States to the satisfaction of
registration officials.78
Not surprisingly, after the adoption of the
“understanding clause,” black voter registration plummeted, while the levels
of white voter registration decreased to a lesser degree.79
The defendant’s attorney quoted the famous passage in Yick Wo v. Hopkins
for the proposition that a facially neutral law may violate equal protection:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is
still within the prohibition of the Constitution.80
In Williams, decided two years after Plessy,81 the Court ignored its own words
and distinguished Yick Wo: “[I]t has not been shown that [the] actual
administration [of Mississippi’s ‘understanding clause’] was evil, only that evil
was possible under [it].”82 At this point in history, and for a long time
thereafter, a judicial search for legislative motive was difficult and
disfavored.83
74. 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding that the categorical exclusion of black citizens from juries
violated the right of a black criminal defendant to equal protection of the law).
75. See Williams, 170 U.S. at 213-14.
76. Id. at 214.
77. See id. at 223.
78. See id. at 217 n.1.
79. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 85 (3d rev. ed. 1974);
cf. ALBERT D. KIRWAN, REVOLT OF THE REDNECKS, MISSISSIPPI POLITICS: 1876-1925, at 71-76
(1951) (discussing the detrimental effect of Mississippi’s “understanding clause” and poll tax
requirements on both black and white voters, but demonstrating a greater impact on black voters
overall).
80. Williams, 170 U.S. at 225 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)
(holding that racially discriminatory administration of a facially neutral law violated equal
protection)).
81. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that “separate but equal” places of
public accommodation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause),
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
82. Williams, 170 U.S. at 225.
83. See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 34-35.
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Dean Monnet distinguished Williams rather than attacking it. According to
the Dean, in the Mississippi case, there was nothing resembling a “grandfather
clause” at issue.84 Because the “understanding clause,” on its face, was no
different from a literacy test, which remained constitutional and legal until the
Voting Rights Act of 1965,85 the issue was whether discriminatory
administration could be proven.86 By contrast, in the Oklahoma case, the issue
was not discriminatory administration—proven or not; the problem was the
plain meaning of the clause.87 Monnet contended that race discrimination was
apparent on the face of the amendment:
Does it not, when taken by its four corners, manifest an emphatic
intention to do the exact thing forbidden by the Fifteenth
Amendment, but to do it by the use of other language and of
different modes of expression? If there can be any doubt of this
intention, debates on such provisions are a legitimate method of
throwing light upon it . . . .88
Here, the Dean focused on the decisive heart of the controversy. Would the
U.S. Supreme Court examine the constitutional amendment to find its “fair
intendment?”89 Dean Monnet turned to the history of Louisiana’s “grandfather
clause” because Oklahoma maintained no record of legislative debates. He
explained, “[The debates] of the Louisiana constitutional convention on the
Louisiana provision, which Oklahoma followed to a considerable extent, are
available, and these show clearly, unmistakably, and without reserve an
intention to thwart the Fifteenth Amendment and to deny suffrage to the negro
because he is a negro.”90
Not content to rest on the uncertain quest for the meaning of legislative
history, Dean Monnet continued, “[I]s not the language itself
discriminatory? . . . And where the intent and meaning of language are so
clear, is not the substance to be looked at rather than the form, and is it not a
trespass upon the dignity of a court to expect it to refuse to brush aside so thin

84. See Monnet, supra note 2, at 56.
85. Compare Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (holding that
literacy tests did not violate the Constitution), with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)
(finding that Congress may ban literacy tests); see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 to 1973bb-1 (2006))
(superseding race-based state-law voting restrictions).
86. Monnet, supra note 2, at 56.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 42.
90. Id. at 56-57.
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a gauze of words?”91 The Dean emphasized that there was no alternative
explanation either in Oklahoma or in the many other southern states that had
embraced the tactic of disenfranchisement.92
Finally, the Dean addressed the issue of a remedy. His analysis was
Jeffersonian,93 disappointingly so. He knew that Oklahoma’s behavior, like
the conduct of other southern states, violated the law, and he drew a sound
conclusion: “It is not an inspiring spectacle to see a portion of the organic law
of the land rendered nugatory by apathetic assent, and it is not calculated to
inspire respect for constitutions.”94 But being a practical man, he did not know
what to do. Monnet was skeptical that there was, as so often promised, a
remedy for every violation of a right.95 He placed little faith in the utility of
a civil suit, a criminal prosecution, or a suit in equity: “It is doubtful, therefore,
if anything adequate can be done in the courts. It is another example of the
truth often clearly observable in the history of English law that the remedy lags
behind the right in spite of the familiar maxim to the contrary.”96
The Dean also saw little relief coming from the nation’s politics. Congress
could pass additional enforcement measures, reduce the number of
representatives from the South, or try to vindicate constitutionalism by
repealing the Fifteenth Amendment (on the theory that it is better not to retain
a provision so widely defied and violated).97 But, Monnet concluded,
“Congress contemplate[d] no such action.”98 Also, he knew that “public
sentiment in neither the north nor the south would sustain a policy of radical
enforcement. Public sentiment in the north [was] apathetic, while in the south
the racial feeling [was] so powerful that endless new expedients would be
resorted to in order to maintain the supremacy of the white race.”99
Unconvincingly, the Dean added that “the southern states [were] making the
most of a bad situation. They ha[d] no desire to show disrespect for the
Constitution, but on the other hand [could not] be expected, without strenuous
effort to discover methods of correction, to accept intolerable conditions.”100
Regrettably, his ultimate recommendation lacked the force of his indictment
91. Id. at 57.
92. See id. at 57-59.
93. See MCKOWN, supra note 11, at 239 (“The Dean especially liked the work of James
Madison and the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson.”).
94. Monnet, supra note 2, at 62.
95. See id. at 59-60.
96. Id. at 60.
97. Monnet, supra note 2, at 60-61; see also KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 70-71 (describing
ambivalence about the amendment in the North).
98. Monnet, supra note 2, at 61.
99. Id. at 62.
100. Id.
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of the Oklahoma Supreme Court rationale: “Whether the Fifteenth Amendment
was ever necessary to protect a race newly born to civil rights, it must be
apparent even to a casual observer of southern affairs at the present time that
a persistent attempt to enforce it fully in the light of its initial conception
would be little less than a national calamity.”101
III. The Fate of the Grandfather Clause in Oklahoma
One year after publication of his article, the issues raised by Dean Monnet
came before the U.S. Supreme Court in Guinn v. United States.102 Almost
three years after the article, a unanimous Court found the constitutional issue
to be clear.103 The Court’s unanimity and its perception of clarity, however,
obscured its own past conduct and its own responsibility for widespread
defiance of the Fifteenth Amendment. Almost forty years earlier in United
States v. Reese, the Court struck down a federal law enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment.104 This federal statute had been used to prosecute election
officials for denying the vote to a black man alleged not to have paid a poll
tax.105 The Court insisted that federal enforcement measures could not target
poll taxes, literacy tests, or other techniques of black disenfranchisement, but
only state statutes that explicitly drew lines on the basis of race.106 So, initially
at least, the Fifteenth Amendment did not seem to be a formidable obstacle to
disguised devices for black disenfranchisement. Cases like Williams v.
Mississippi only underscored the apparent reality that the Supreme Court had
abandoned the task of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment.107
Guinn “grew out of the most unlikely circumstances.”108 Two Oklahoma
election officers were convicted of the federal crime of “having conspired
unlawfully, wilfully, and fraudulently to deprive certain negro citizens, on
account of their race and color, of a right to vote at a general election . . . in
1910.”109 The indictment in the case specified that the black citizens were

101. Id. at 62-63.
102. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
103. See id. at 363-64.
104. See 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
105. Id. at 215.
106. See id. at 218.
107. See 170 U.S. 213 (1898); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
108. BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 927.
109. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 354 (1915). Here, the Dean had made his only
mistake of prophecy: he had predicted that a criminal prosecution would do no good for blacks
injured by Oklahoma’s law, and would be “even more likely to terminate unsuccessfully
because of local prejudice and feeling.” Monnet, supra note 2, at 60.
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entitled to vote under state law and the Fifteenth Amendment.110 Republicans
had pressed for prosecutions, as had civil rights organizations.111 Despite
contrary orders from Republican President Taft, who was reluctant to enforce
the Fifteenth Amendment, an insubordinate U.S. Attorney went forward with
the prosecution.112 Eventually, despite many facts and circumstances that
might have derailed the case, both the Taft administration and, subsequently,
the Democratic Wilson administration pressed the case before the U.S.
Supreme Court.113 During oral argument, Solicitor General John W. Davis
“put the constitutional objections to the Grandfather Clause with elegant force.
Whatever Davis may have lacked in zeal for the ultimate goal of black suffrage
was overcome by his aversion to what he thought a patent evasion of the
Constitution.”114 The case was argued in October 1913, but it took over a year
and a half for the Court to render judgment in a unanimous opinion written by
Chief Justice Edward White.115
The Court’s opinion noted some of the political circumstances surrounding
Oklahoma’s adoption of the only permanent “grandfather clause” in
undramatic, even neutral phrases: The people had approved an amendment to
the state’s constitution.116 In the congressional election immediately
following, two election officers had refused to allow black citizens to vote.117
The officers had been indicted and tried before a district court that had advised
the jury, accurately, that “by the 15th Amendment the States were prohibited
from discriminating as to suffrage because of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.”118 The trial court had further instructed the jury that Congress
had exercised its enforcement authority to pass a statute providing as follows:
All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law
to vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory,
district, . . . municipality, . . . or other territorial subdivision, shall
be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections without
distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any
constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or
110. Guinn, 238 U.S. at 354.
111. See BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 927-32.
112. See id. at 932.
113. See id. at 934-39.
114. Id. at 939.
115. Id. at 947. In reality, the opinion might not have been as clear and unanimous as it
seemed. See id. at 945-47 (discussing the theory that the delay in rendering an opinion may
have been due to divisions within the Court).
116. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 355 (1915).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Territory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary
notwithstanding.119
Finally, the trial court had charged the jury that
if [the defendant officers] knew or believed these colored persons
were entitled to vote, and their purpose was to unfairly and
fraudulently deny the right of suffrage to them, or any of them
entitled thereto, on account of their race and color, then their
purpose was a corrupt one, and they cannot be shielded by their
official positions.120
The case presented two questions, as stated by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, which had certified the issues for Supreme Court review.121
Both addressed the apparent conflict between the “grandfather clause” and the
Fifteenth Amendment.122
After summarizing the arguments of the parties, the Court approached the
Fifteenth Amendment issue in technical and legalistic language.123 Little in the
opinion is remembered for grace, eloquence, or the capacity to inspire. The
Justices saw the differences between the parties as “much narrower than [they]
would seem to be.”124 When the awkward language is sorted out, it appears
that the Justices reached a rather simple conclusion: if the Oklahoma law did
not violate the Fifteenth Amendment, it would be hard to imagine what law
would. The Court observed that Oklahoma’s constitutional provision
“involve[d] an unmistakable, although . . . somewhat disguised, refusal to give
effect to the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment by creating a standard
which . . . call[ed] to life the very conditions which that Amendment was

119. Id. at 355-56 (quoting REV. STAT. § 2004 (originally enacted as Act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, § 1, 16 Stat. 140) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006))).
120. Id. at 356.
121. Id. at 356-57. The Eighth Circuit asked,
XX1. Was the amendment to the constitution of Oklahoma . . . valid?
XX2. Was that amendment void in so far as it attempted to debar from the right
or privilege of voting for a qualified candidate for a Member of Congress in
Oklahoma, unless they were able to read and write any section of the constitution
of Oklahoma, negro citizens of the United States who were otherwise qualified to
vote . . . , but who were not, and none of whose lineal ancestors was, entitled to
vote under any form of government on January 1, 1866, or at any time prior
thereto, because they were then slaves?
Id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 360-63.
124. Id. at 361.
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adopted to destroy and which it had destroyed.”125 Though the terms of the
Oklahoma law did not mention race, it was clear to the Justices that race
discrimination was the sole motivation for the “grandfather clause,” as Dean
Monnet had argued in his article.126 Focusing on the meaning of the Fifteenth
Amendment, the Justices made several points. First, the provision “[did] not
take away from the state governments in a general sense the power over
suffrage which ha[d] belonged to those governments from the beginning” of
the Republic.127 The Court also bowed deeply in the direction of federalism
doctrine and its foundational importance, stating that the states’ power over
voting qualifications was essential to “the division of state and national
authority under the Constitution.”128 According to the Court, the Fifteenth
Amendment contemplated no change in these principles, without which “both
the authority of the nation and the State would fall to the ground.”129
Second, however, it was equally clear to the Justices that broad state
discretion was subject to the limit imposed by the Fifteenth Amendment. The
Court maintained that neither the federal government nor the state
governments could abridge or deny voting rights because of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.130
The next step in the Court’s analysis was to assess Oklahoma’s purpose.
The Court did so without considering legislative history, but it did not ignore
the past altogether.131 The Court noted that the “grandfather clause” itself did
not refer to race.132 Instead, it drew lines based on a date in the past: January
1, 1866.133 If a person could vote on that date, the law did not require him to
take a literacy test.134 Moreover, a lineal descendant of such a person was not
obligated to take a literacy test.135 Even persons residing in foreign countries
on that date or descendants of such persons were exempt from the test.136 The
key passage in the Court’s opinion is not particularly memorable, but it has the
virtue of clarity, and it even ends with a touch of sarcasm directed against
Oklahoma and the state’s supreme court:

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
See id. at 364-65; see also supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
Guinn, 238 U.S. at 362.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 364.
Id. at 364-65.
Id.
Id. at 364 (quoting OKLA. CONST. of 1907, art. 3, § 4a (1910)).
Id.
Id.
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It is true [Oklahoma’s law] contains no express words of an
exclusion from the standard which it establishes of any person on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude prohibited
by the Fifteenth Amendment, but the standard itself inherently
brings that result into existence since it is based purely upon a
period of time before the enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment
and makes that period the controlling and dominant test of the right
of suffrage. In other words, we seek in vain for any ground which
would sustain any other interpretation but that the provision,
recurring to the conditions existing before the Fifteenth
Amendment was adopted and the continuance of which the
Fifteenth Amendment prohibited, proposed by in substance and
effect lifting those conditions over to a period of time after the
Amendment, to make them the basis of the right to suffrage
conferred in direct and positive disregard of the Fifteenth
Amendment: And the same result, we are of opinion, is
demonstrated by considering whether it is possible to discover any
basis of reason for the standard thus fixed other than the purpose
above stated. We say this because we are unable to discover how,
unless the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment were
considered, the slightest reason was afforded for basing the
classification upon a period of time prior to the Fifteenth
Amendment. Certainly it cannot be said that there was any peculiar
necromancy in the time named which engendered attributes
affecting the qualification to vote which would not exist at another
and different period unless the Fifteenth Amendment was in
view.137
Of some historical note, the Justices hinted at an approach that emerged
later in constitutional history. The Court concluded that the case involved “the
establishment of a right whose exercise lies at the very basis of
government.”138 Given the importance of the right to vote, the Court explained
that “a much more exacting standard is required than would ordinarily obtain
where the influence of the declared unconstitutionality of one provision of a
statute upon another and constitutional provision is required to be fixed.”139
The Chief Justice used opaque language, but it was still a portent of the “strict
scrutiny” analysis of later years.140 He suggested that even if a court must
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 364-65.
Id. at 366.
Id.
See supra note 70.
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defer to the state’s power on literacy tests generally, it must not do so if a
law’s effect was intended racial exclusion.141 Ultimately, Oklahoma lost
because it could not provide a plausible explanation for drawing lines based
on January 1, 1866.
Guinn is an exceptional case of the Plessy era. Throughout the end of the
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, southern Democratic
politicians, with the aid of the Supreme Court, fulfilled campaign promises to
restrict the African American’s place in society.142 The effective exclusion of
blacks from southern politics resulted in the parallel and intended consequence
of legally mandated segregation on streetcars, in waiting rooms, in hospitals,
in prison, in housing, and in cemeteries.143 The laws imposed segregation even
in the most trivial places—for example, at drinking fountains.144 The
Oklahoma Legislature made its proud contribution in 1915, the same year the
Supreme Court decided Guinn, by mandating segregation in telephone
booths.145
Guinn was not the end of the story, even in Oklahoma, because the Sooner
State was stubbornly committed to its policy of thinly disguised racism. After
Guinn, the state legislature passed a statute exempting persons who had voted
in the 1914 general election from the need to register to vote.146 All other
persons were required to register within a twelve-day period in 1916 or they
would be permanently disenfranchised.147 The statute was signed by Governor
Robert Lee Williams in 1916,148 the same Robert Lee Williams who had ruled
on the “grandfather clause” in Atwater.149 No blacks had voted in 1914
because the “grandfather clause” was still in effect.150 Thus, the same citizens
barred by the unconstitutional “grandfather clause” would face permanent
disenfranchisement if they did not act promptly. The law was a transparent
evasion of Guinn, but it took two decades before the evasion was challenged.

141. See Guinn, 238 U.S. at 366.
142. See WOODWARD, supra note 79, at 82-93.
143. See id. at 97-102.
144. See id. at 98.
145. Id. at 101-02.
146. 26 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 74 (1937) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 26, 1916, ch. 24,
§ 4, 1916 Okla. Sess. Laws 34), invalidated by Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
147. See Lane, 307 U.S. at 275-76.
148. Williams served as governor from 1915 through 1919. See Oklahoma Governors Since
Statehood, http://www.ok.gov/governor/govlist.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
149. See Atwater v. Hassett, 1910 OK 299, 111 P. 802; see also supra text accompanying
notes 50-52.
150. Recall that the clause remained effective until 1915. See Guinn v. United States, 238
U.S. 347 (1915).
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In 1938, the 1916 statute came before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit,151 which would eventually render better decisions and make its
own contributions to the fight for racial equality under the law.152
Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit also once rendered judgments that
perpetuated the shame of race discrimination. The case of Lane v. Wilson was
one such case.153 When the case was argued, one of the four judges on the
circuit was the former Oklahoma chief justice and governor, Robert Lee
Williams.154 Of course, he did not sit on the panel that rendered judgment.155
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit upheld the political work of their colleague.
In an opinion that strains credulity, the appellate panel ruled that blacks who
had been barred from voting and whites who had not voted, for whatever
reason, in the 1914 elections “were on the same footing.”156 Therefore,
according to the court, there was no discrimination.
The petitioner (plaintiff below) appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
was not persuaded by the arguments of Oklahoma or the analysis of the Tenth
Circuit.157 Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote the opinion of the Court and
explained the problem with Oklahoma’s attempt to make an end run around
Guinn and the Fifteenth Amendment: “The Amendment nullifies sophisticated
as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination. It hits onerous procedural
requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the
colored race although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to
race.”158 Even Frankfurter, a dedicated advocate of judicial self-restraint,
thought that the facts “[left] no escape from the conclusion that the means
chosen as substitutes for the invalidated ‘grandfather clause’ were themselves
invalid under the Fifteenth Amendment.”159

151. Lane v. Wilson, 98 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1938), rev’d, 307 U.S. 268.
152. See, e.g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970)
(anticipating disparate-impact theory in Title VII law); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797
(D. Kan. 1951) (ruling for the school board, but including findings of fact helpful to the
plaintiffs in subsequent litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court). The significance of both the
Jones and Brown cases in American legal history is discussed in Tepker, supra note 51, at 36366, 398-99.
153. See 98 F.2d 980.
154. See generally DALE & MORRISON, supra note 51, at 279-300.
155. See Lane, 98 F.2d 980.
156. Id. at 984.
157. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
158. Id. at 275.
159. Id. at 277.
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IV. Legacy
In our own time, it is difficult to weigh the contributions of a man like Dean
Monnet with both respect and appropriate perspective. There is a tendency to
embellish. Praise from the legal profession or Oklahoma political elites seems
self-congratulatory or even defensive, as if designed to cover up past
complicity in past discrimination.
Dean Monnet’s article was a defense of law and constitutionalism. It was
a response to the conduct of many states justly alleged to be “a fraud upon the
Constitution of the United States.”160 It was also an expression of hope and
confidence that the Supreme Court might yet do a better job of upholding the
law. It made an important contribution to the quest for justice, even if it was
not a prophetic tract on the need for racial equality. He proposed no blueprint
or reform designed to progress toward a liberal, integrated society. As a man
of his time and place, he expressed some sympathy for what he perceived to
be the plight of white citizens in southern communities. Some of his
words—skeptical, conservative, even fearful—provoke a justifiable impatience
in modern readers.
Perhaps Julien Monnet is best understood as an Atticus Finch, the fictional
protagonist of To Kill A Mockingbird,161 who understood his duty to the law,
even if, because of paternalism or a prevalent regional habit of stereotyping,
he did not understand the depth and intractability of the law’s injustice to his
black neighbors. Recently, there is a pattern in American legal scholarship to
discount the contributions of men like the fictional Finch. Does he really
deserve a symbolic place as “a role model for the legal profession”?162 Today,
some academics and social critics—with the advantage of a retrospective
view—argue that he does not.163 Finch lacked outrage. He was inclined to
accommodation. He showed insufficient zeal for reform. He was not a civil
rights activist. It is not enough that Finch fought—at great risk to home,
family, and future—to save a black man unjustly accused of raping a white
girl. It is not enough that he did his duty. His fight must meet twenty-firstcentury standards and sensibilities. Critics opine that the fictional Finch ought
to have done more. Such arguments use a modern reading of a 1960 novel
depicting a Depression-era rape trial to show “how badly the brand of

160. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903).
161. HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
162. Malcolm Gladwell, The Courthouse Ring: Atticus Finch and the Limits of Southern
Liberalism, NEW YORKER, Aug. 10 & 17, 2009, at 26, 27.
163. See, e.g., id.
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Southern populism Finch represents has aged over the past fifty years.”164 Of
course! There is an absurdity and an intellectual arrogance when a historian
uses moral standards established and prevalent in one age to retrospectively
judge a person or a people of an earlier age.165 As Henry Steele Commager
once wrote, “The historian’s task is not to judge but to understand.”166
Finch’s fight against a race-baiting prosecution was a fictionalized act of
professionalism and bravery to serve the law. He defended his client
zealously, eloquently, and in good faith. There is honor in that act alone. In
retrospect, despite possible anachronistic criticism based on the standards of
many years later, a similar respect is owed to Julien Monnet: His article was
professional and courageous. As the leader of an academic institution, he
displayed the virtues of a legal scholar. He used the tools of logic and realism
to see Oklahoma’s law for what it was. He took his stand, which was derived
from a concern for constitutional integrity.
Dean Monnet could take personal and professional satisfaction that the U.S.
Supreme Court vindicated his position—twice. Whether he did so is
unknown. He predicted the results and accurately set forth a compelling
rationale for them. The role his article played in the deliberations of the
Justices is also unknown; however, it seems probable that the Justices noticed
the testimony of the dean of the state’s law school about the inescapable
meaning and purpose of the “grandfather clause”—and his response to the
rationale of a disturbing decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court—in the
pages of the Harvard Law Review. Both the Monnet article and the Guinn
opinion set aside the principle that legislative motivation ought not to be a
basis for constitutional judgments; both found the facts clear and
unmistakable. The Justices did not venture to discuss equal protection issues,
but they were unanimous in not finding any basis in reason for the clause, just
as Dean Monnet had argued.
Guinn probably made little practical difference to black residents in
Oklahoma.167 Still, as Michael J. Klarman has observed in a comprehensive,
skeptical assessment of the Supreme Court’s decisions on race discrimination,
Court decisions can matter in ways other than producing concrete
changes in social practices. Perhaps the civil rights victories of the
Progressive Era should be seen as “more symbols of hope than
164. Id. at 28.
165. See HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE SEARCH FOR A USABLE PAST 314-22 (1967)
(summarizing historians’ professional arguments in favor of restraint and perspective when
rendering moral judgments).
166. Id. at 316.
167. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 460.
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effective bulwarks against the racial injustice that permeated
American law.” Success for any social protest movement requires
convincing potential participants that its goals are feasible. . . . At
a time when the oppression of southern blacks seemed immutable,
perhaps “[Chief Justice White’s] Court shook the illusion that this
arrangement was permanent.”168
Apart from questions about the social worth of Guinn or Harvard Law
Review articles generally, Monnet’s fine argument promoted a vision of law
“calculated to inspire respect for constitutions.”169 This professional
dedication alone helps to explain one reason why he is remembered as “a
highly competent, efficient, and principled dean.”170 Julien Monnet taught his
students to care, above all, about the quality of law—as all deans, students,
judges, and lawyers should.

168. Id. at 93.
169. Monnet, supra note 2, at 62.
170. LEVY, supra note 1, at 222.
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